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THE LAWS OF SECURITIES LAWYERING
AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY
DONGJU SONG
In our complex society the accountant’s certificate and the lawyer’s
opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent
1
than the chisel or the crowbar.

INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act2
in response to a barrage of corporate governance crises and flagging
investor confidence in the securities markets.3 In section 307, the Act
expands the powers of the Securities and Exchange Commission
4
(SEC) by authorizing it to regulate lawyers. In turn, the SEC
promulgated regulations (Part 205) that implemented the
5
requirements of section 307. Naturally, corporate lawyers and
various bar organizations protested this regulation, arguing that it is
Copyright © 2003 by DongJu Song.
1. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964). Judge Friendly wrote this
statement in 1964, a time when the volume of publicly traded, domestic equity securities was
three-tenths of a percent of what it is today. Market Statistics, at http://www.nyse.com/
marketinfo/1022221393023.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(listing share volume on February 17, 1964 as 4,782,320 shares outstanding and on September
30, 2003 as 1,590,417,109 shares outstanding). Common sense indicates that these tools must
have grown even more potent and dangerous in such an environment; a glance at the history of
Enron or Adelphia proves it. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald & Diana B. Henriques, Enron’s Many
Strands: The Company Unravels, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at C1 (describing the collapse of
Enron and the role of accountants and lawyers in the events leading up to the collapse); Andrew
Ross Sorkin, Fallen Founder of Adelphia Tries to Explain, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2003, at C1
(describing the collapse of Adelphia and its founders’ claims of reliance on the advice of lawyers
and accountants).
2. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003)).
3. S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 2 (2002); H.R. REP. NO. 107-414, at 18–19 (2002).
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245.
5. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act
Release No. 47,276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2003))
(hereinafter “Part 205 Release”).

010904 SONG.DOC

258

01/30/04 9:04 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:257

destructive to the attorney-client relationship and duplicative of state
6
regulation. Several scholars and the plaintiff’s bar, on the other hand,
have expressed approval of the rules or protested that they do not go
7
far enough.
In the debate, however, comprehensive analysis of the precise
nature of Part 205’s departure from preexisting legal regimes has
8
been scarce. This Note seeks to fill this void by analyzing the various
9
provisions of Part 205 in light of, and in contrast to, the primary
preexisting bases of legal responsibility. These legal bases include
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (section 10(b)),10
SEC Rule 10b-5 (Rule 10b-5),11 SEC Rule of Practice 102(e) (Rule

6. Terry Carter, Going Before the SEC: ABA, Others Criticize Proposed Lawyer Regs,
A.B.A. J. E-REPORT (Dec. 20, 2002), at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/d20sec.html (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
7. Id.; Jonathan D. Glater, A Legal Uproar over Proposals to Regulate the Profession,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at C1.
8. Indeed, discussion has generally assumed a radical departure and continued from there.
See, e.g., Letter from Richard W. Painter to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 12, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/rwpainter1.htm (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (“[The proposed rules] will allow honest lawyers and clients to thrive in a legal
and economic system that values disclosure—including disclosure by lawyers to their own
clients—over deceit.”); Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC
(Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/sullivanc1.htm (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (“[T]he adoption of noisy withdrawal rules by the Commission
would represent such a radical departure from the traditional standards of behavior for
attorneys and the expectations of their clients that it should be deferred.”).
9. This Note’s use of the term “primary” here is meant to exclude claims that are
generally not brought by third parties. Lawyer liability predicated on such claims, including
malpractice, negligence, contract, or other common-law claims, is severely restricted by the lack
of privity between the lawyer and the third party. See Nancy Lewis, Lawyer’s Liability to Third
Parties: The Ideology of Advocacy Reframed, 66 OR. L. REV. 801, 804–06 (1987) (discussing the
privity doctrine and its narrowly interpreted exceptions).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
11. Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Contrivances, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
There are, of course, a plethora of securities laws violations other than those based on Rule 10b5. However, given the far greater extent to which Rule 10b-5 case law has been developed and
the breadth of Rule 10b-5 antifraud provisions, this Note will use Rule 10b-5 as a proxy for the
securities laws generally. Key points in this development have included, inter alia, Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (requiring that a party be a purchaser or
seller of affected securities to have standing to bring a suit under Rule 10b-5); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring scienter as an element of a Rule 10b-5 violation);
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (requiring misrepresentation or omission as
an element of a Rule 10b-5 violation); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (requiring
reliance or fraud-on-the-market as an element of a Rule 10b-5 violation); Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (applying Rule 10b-5 to insider trading); and United States v.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (extending reach of insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5 to
misappropriation theories).
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12
102(e)), and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
13
Rules). Part I briefly explores the history and roles of these legal
regimes as a basis of attorney conduct. Understanding these regimes
is crucial to understanding Part 205, for these preexisting regimes
represent both the source of the Part 205 concepts and the status quo
on which Part 205 was intended to improve. Part II then compares the
key features of section 307 and Part 205 to the corresponding features
of the preexisting regimes. To do so, it develops and applies an
analytical model examining the position of each of the regimes along
four general dimensions.14 Disaggregation of the inquiry into these
four parts will demonstrate that in each dimension, Part 205
essentially incorporated some of the most expansive preexisting
notions of a lawyer’s duty, and merged these notions into a single
regulatory scheme. Finally, Part III briefly analyzes the consequences
of Part 205 from a policy perspective, using the analysis of Part II to
examine both the benefits and concerns, and concludes that Part 205
is likely to create a fundamental and needed shift in the role of
corporate attorneys.

12. Appearance and Practice Before the Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2003).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2002). Although the Model Rules in themselves
are merely precatory, forty-one states and the District of Columbia have enacted binding
professional responsibility codes based on the Model Rules. E. Norman Veasey, Chair’s
Introduction and Executive Summary to the Report of the Commission on Evaluation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-report.html (Aug. 2001) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal). Also, the scope of this Note includes only those legal regimes
that apply at a more or less national level; as such, there is no analysis of either specific state
professional responsibility codes or state blue-sky laws.
14. The four dimensions are (1) to whom the regime applies, (2) the triggering standard for
the regime’s duties, (3) the duties imposed, and (4) the enforcement mechanisms of the regime.
By essentially asking who, when, what, and why, these dimensions are intended to cover all
aspects of each legal regime while permitting careful analysis through disaggregation. The
choice of these dimensions and the dimensionality approach generally are explained infra notes
43–46 and accompanying text. Although this Note is not unique in asking what changes section
307 brings, earlier scholarship focuses on general conclusions or specific aspects to illuminate
policy analysis or political conclusions. See, e.g., David J. Beck, The Legal Profession at the
Crossroads: Who Will Write the Future Rules Governing the Conduct of Lawyers Representing
Public Corporations?, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 873, 900–14 (2003) (discussing the federalism,
disclosure, and liability concerns created by section 307 generally); John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1303–10 (2003)
(discussing the appropriateness of the general gatekeeping role imposed on attorneys by section
307); Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future
Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1126–30 (2003) (examining the incentive structure for lawyers
and managers created by the general section 307 scheme); Susan P. Koniak, When the
Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1270–78 (2003)
(characterizing specific language of section 307’s triggering standard as a thinly disguised
product of successful lobbying by the organized bar).
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I. PREEXISTING LEGAL REGIMES
This Note examines section 307 and Part 205 in light of the three
primary, preexisting legal regimes: (1) section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5;
(2) Rule 102(e); and (3) the Model Rules. These regimes were
established long before section 307 was enacted, and thus constituted
the backdrop against which section 307 and Part 205 were
15
formulated. Examination of these regimes serves two purposes.
First, as will be seen, these regimes were the immediate sources of all
the essential concepts of lawyer responsibility that the SEC used in
drafting Part 205. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the collapse
of corporate governance that spurred the Sarbanes-Oxley Act clearly
demonstrated some form of failure, whether inherent or in
enforcement, of these regimes. Accordingly, these regimes are the
foils against which Part 205 must necessarily be tested to determine its
efficacy and appropriateness. Parts II and III specifically focus on
exactly this comparison. In turn, this Part will briefly describe the
nature, history, and role of these preexisting legal regimes.
A. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
Section 10(b)16 was enacted, like the rest of the Securities
17
Exchange Act of 1934, in response to the massive loss in value of
outstanding securities in the Great Crash of 1929 (and the first years
of the Great Depression).18 In 1942, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5
as a general mechanism to effectuate the broad mandate of section
19
10(b). Together, section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and the jurisprudence
surrounding these provisions form a comprehensive, if complex,
antifraud scheme that prohibits the use of any fraudulent or
manipulative devices that affect the trading of securities.20 Moreover,
despite the absence of any express intent of Congress or the SEC to
15. Securities lawyers are usually subject to all three of these legal regimes simultaneously,
and though this Note focuses on the distinctions, the responsibilities implied by these regimes
overlap significantly. See generally infra Part II (comparing and contrasting these legal regimes).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
17. Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2000)).
18. Katharine J. Fick, Such Stuff as Laws Are Made on: Interpreting the Exchange Act to
Reach Transnational Fraud, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 441, 445.
19. Exchange Act Release No. 3230, 7 Fed. Reg. 3804 (May 21, 1942); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975).
20. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471–77 (1977) (describing
development and operation of Rule 10b-5).
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provide for a private right of action arising under Rule 10b-5, an
21
implied private right of action was first recognized in 1946, and was
22
confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1971. Largely due to this
development, Rule 10b-5 has become perhaps the foremost vehicle
for enforcing the securities laws.23
Until fairly recently, Rule 10b-5 liability could attach for either a
primary violation of the Rule or for aiding and abetting such a
24
primary violation. Several cases made clear that a wide range of
attorney activities could give rise to aiding and abetting liability.25
However, in 1994, the liability standards were thrown into great
confusion when the Supreme Court eliminated any private right of
26
action for aiding and abetting a Rule 10b-5 violation, though the
SEC’s right to pursue such actions was subsequently preserved by
statute.27 Thus, attorneys who engage in securities fraud are still
privately liable under Rule 10b-5 as primary participants if their
conduct meets the test for primary violations, and are also subject to
SEC enforcement actions as either primary participants or aiders and
abettors.
B. Rule 102(e)
Rule 102(e) was also promulgated by the SEC, but it was
promulgated as a Rule of Practice rather than as a substantive
regulation.28 Subsection (1) of the rule allows the SEC to censure or
prohibit an attorney from further practice before the SEC for

21. Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
22. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
23. Then-Justice Rehnquist famously wrote that private actions under Rule 10b-5 are a
“judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.” Blue Chip Stamps, 421
U.S. at 737.
24. See, e.g., Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646, 652 (9th Cir. 1988)
(setting forth the elements of an aiding and abetting violation).
25. See, e.g., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1021 (2d Cir. 1978) (imposing liability on an
attorney for false statements in an opinion letter); SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F.
Supp. 682, 712–15 (D.D.C. 1978) (imposing liability on attorneys for failing to suspend merger
closing in the face of questionable accounting representations). The availability of aiding and
abetting liability may have helped slow the development of case law on an attorney’s primary
participant liability for Rule 10b-5 violations.
26. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1994).
27. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104(2), 109 Stat.
737, 757 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (2000)).
28. Appearance and Practice Before the Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2003).
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29
unethical conduct or violation of the securities laws. Traditionally,
the SEC chose to apply Rule 102(e) against accountants. However, in
1981, the SEC announced a sweeping new interpretation of the rule,
stating that an attorney who realized that his advice on compliance
with the securities laws was being ignored or not sought in good faith
had a duty to take some affirmative action to correct the underlying
problem.30 But the SEC’s expansive interpretation of Rule 102(e) was
quickly scaled back, when in a 1982 address, the then-general counsel
of the SEC expressed his opinion that the SEC should bring Rule
102(e) administrative proceedings only against those attorneys found
to have violated section 10(b) by a judicial tribunal.31 The SEC has
since exercised its prosecutorial discretion in accordance with that
32
policy, so that as a practical matter, the importance of Rule 102(e) is
diminished because it does not require a response by an attorney in
any contexts where such action is not required by Rule 10b-5.
Nonetheless, Rule 102(e) as it was interpreted by In re Carter &
Johnson33 remains influential and was cited as a basis for section 307
34
by one of that section’s authors.

C. The Model Rules
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were developed by the
American Bar Association (ABA). The ABA has taken the lead in
establishing national ethical norms since 1908, when it adopted the
35
Canons of Professional Ethics. Eventually, these broad aspirational

29. Id.
30. In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at
84,172 (March 25, 1981).
31. Edward F. Greene, Remarks to the New York County Lawyer’s Association, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,089, at 84,802 (Jan. 18, 1982). One possible reason for the retreat was
continuing doubt over whether the SEC’s interpretation of Rule 102(e) was properly authorized
by the congressional grant of authority to the SEC, despite unanimous lower court rulings
holding that such authorization existed. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct
for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8150, Exchange Act Release No. 46,868, 67 Fed. Reg.
71,670, 71,671 n.13 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (hereinafter “Part 205 Proposal”). Obviously, the
explicit authorization of Sarbanes-Oxley eliminates this concern. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2003) (describing the scope of SEC authority over
an attorney’s professional conduct).
32. Part 205 Proposal, supra note 31, at 71,672.
33. In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 84,172.
34. 148 CONG. REC. S6524, 6551–52 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards).
35. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS (1908); Lawrence W. Kessler, The Unchanging Face of
Legal Malpractice: How the “Captured” Regulators of the Bar Protect Attorneys, 86 MARQ. L.
REV. 457, 459 n.5 (2002).
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standards gave way to a more enforcement-based regime in the 1969
36
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules of
37
Professional Conduct were adopted in 1983 and underwent their last
major revision as part of the Ethics 2000 initiative in 2002.38 The
Model Rules, unlike Rule 10b-5 or Rule 102(e), are not administered
judicially or on the federal level. Instead, the forty-one states (and the
District of Columbia) that have adopted professional responsibility
codes based on the Model Rules39 enforce them through state bar
40
disciplinary committees and various other disciplinary mechanisms.
II. ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIVE DUTIES
Legal regimes that originate at different points in time and in
response to a variety of concerns naturally differ in language,
structure, and interpretation. Unfortunately, this hampers clear and
direct comparison, a problem exacerbated by the complexity of the
new rules. Section 307 may be only 171 words long,41 but eighty pages
of the Federal Register are devoted to Part 205 in the SEC’s
promulgating releases alone, published before the rules even took
effect.42 Part 205 itself is a long and complex regulation covering an
enormous number of contingencies. It would be extremely difficult
simply to take Part 205 as is, hold it up next to three other complex
regimes, and start to draw and justify rational conclusions.
To facilitate a clear analysis of the various legal structures, this
Note proposes a four-pronged, analytic structure that is based upon
43
the concept of a “corrective action.” Corrective action, as defined

36. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (1969); Kessler, supra note 35, at 459 n.5.
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1983).
38. Center for Professional Responsibility, American Bar Association, Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc_home.html (last visited August
19, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
39. Veasey, supra note 13.
40. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody’s Watching: Legal
Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV.
971, 988–95 (2002) (identifying disciplinary actions in several states).
41. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2003).
42. See Part 205 Release, supra note 5 (adopting the final rule establishing minimum
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing before the SEC); Part 205 Proposal,
supra note 31, at 71,671 (proposing the same); Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8186, Exchange Act Release No. 47,282, 68
Fed. Reg. 6324 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (hereinafter “Noisy Withdrawal Proposal”) (proposing a
rule specifically regarding “noisy withdrawal” provisions).
43. This dimensional approach permits a more careful and detailed analysis by temporarily
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here, is an action intended to prevent or limit the effect of a violation
44
of securities law. Corrective actions could conceivably take many
forms, including the reporting of the violation to others in the
45
corporation, resignation, or disaffirmance of work product. One can
then develop four dimensions of inquiry, posed in the form of
questions to be asked of each legal regime: (1) Who may be required
to take a corrective action?; (2) What knowledge or actions trigger
the duty to take a corrective action?; (3) What corrective actions are
required or permitted?; and (4) What enforcement mechanisms are in
place to ensure compliance?46 The following four Sections address
each of these dimensions in turn.47
A. Who May Be Required to Take a Corrective Action?
The threshold question for any legal regime is the scope of the
regime’s application. Within the universe of attorneys practicing
securities law, the Model Rules would appear to have the broadest
applicability. Because the Model Rules are implemented through
state bars, they apply to every licensed attorney in the country.48 The
eliminating from our view information extraneous to the particular question being asked. In
comparing apples and bananas, it is difficult simply to say which is larger; but if length, width,
and height are examined in turn, the understanding of both objects is far greater than even an
answer to the initial inquiry would have provided.
44. I use the term and definition of “corrective action” here as a logical synthesis of
concepts implicitly used in several other analyses, especially those of the SEC. See, e.g., In re
Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at 84,172 (March
25, 1981) (“What is required, in short, is some prompt action that leads to the conclusion that
the lawyer is engaged in efforts to correct the underlying problem, rather than having
capitulated to the desires of a strong-willed, but misguided client.”). See generally Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission, 17
C.F.R. pt. 205 (2003) (structuring the regulatory scheme around action by the lawyer to correct
a violation of the securities laws or to fulfill fiduciary duties to the corporation).
45. E.g., In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 84,172.
46. Or more briefly: (1) Who?; (2) When?; (3) What?; and (4) Why?
47. The reader may note that splitting the analytical inquiry along these dimensions gives
rise to the danger that interdependencies between these dimensions may be lost. For example,
after Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994),
the extent of attorney liability under Rule 10b-5 depends on whether the violative activity can
be characterized as a primary violation or an aiding and abetting violation. See id. at 191
(holding that no private civil action can be maintained against an attorney for aiding and
abetting a section 10(b) violation). Thus, under Central Bank, the answer to the fourth question
(what enforcement mechanisms apply) varies based on the answer to the second (what triggers a
duty to take corrective action). This Note will endeavor to point out these interdependencies
wherever relevant.
48. More precisely, they apply to every attorney in the forty-two jurisdictions that have
adopted some form of the Model Rules. Veasey, supra note 13.
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exception to this principle is Model Rule 1.13, which applies only to
those lawyers representing organizational entities rather than natural
49
persons. As a practical matter, however, such representation would
include the vast majority of securities and corporate lawyers.
The applicability of Rule 10b-5 has a scope similar to, but not
quite coextensive with, Model Rule 1.13. Rule 10b-5 proscribes
certain activities in connection with the purchase or sale of
50
securities. The vast majority of transactional securities and corporate
lawyers, whether representing public or private corporations, are
subject to Rule 10b-5, because their work is connected with the
purchase or sale of securities. Some securities litigation attorneys who
are subject to Model Rule 1.13, however, are unlikely to encounter a
personal, Rule 10b-5 problem because their practice tends to address
past and publicly known securities laws violations and
misrepresentations, on which investors will no longer reasonably rely
in making decisions to purchase or sell securities.
The scope of Rule 102(e) is also narrower than that of the Model
Rules. By its terms, Rule 102(e) applies to all attorneys, but the
sanctions specified therein will have an effect only on attorneys
51
appearing and practicing before the SEC. In this context, practicing
includes transacting business with the SEC and preparing any
52
document filed with the SEC. Thus, Rule 102(e), though almost
certainly applicable to transactional securities attorneys representing
a public company, probably would not apply to a securities litigation
attorney not actually appearing in an SEC hearing or to an attorney
representing a private company.53 Rule 102(e) is accordingly narrower
in scope than the Model Rules and similar, but not coextensive in
scope, with Rule 10b-5.
Turning now to Part 205, it first appears that its scope, defined as
54
“appearing and practicing before the Commission,” is coextensive
49. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.13(a) (2002).
50. Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Contrivances, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
51. Appearance and Practice Before the Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2003).
52. Id. § 201.102(f).
53. Of course, the exact application of Rule 102(e) will depend on specific facts that may
contradict these general characterizations. For example, the question of whether a specific SEC
filing is required does not turn solely on the question of whether a company is public or private,
but rather on an analysis of whether the issuer or the transaction falls under any of dozens of
statutory categorizations. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77c–d (2000) (listing categories of issuers and
securities exempted from registration of newly issued securities).
54. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(a) (2003).
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with the narrower reach of Rule 102(e). However, Part 205 adopts a
much more expansive definition of “appearing and practicing,”
extending the Rule 102(e) definition to include any representation in
connection with a SEC hearing or investigative procedure and, more
broadly, advising any party that any document need not be filed with
55
the SEC. Attorneys retained or instructed by the chief legal officer
(CLO) or a qualified legal compliance committee (QLCC) of a
company to assert a colorable defense regarding a material violation
are excepted from the Part 205 requirements.56 In general, though, the
SEC intends that Part 205 reach any attorney who adds, excludes, or
characterizes information for a document intended to be filed with
the SEC.57 Thus the “appearing and practicing” definition expands the
reach of Part 205 significantly, at least to that of Rule 10b-5
applicability, and probably to that of Model Rule 1.13.58 Indeed, the
proposed definition would have gone even further by including
foreign attorneys and those members of the bar not acting in their

55. Id. pt. 205.2(a). Thus, attorneys advising private or foreign corporations with no
obligations to the SEC would be included in this definition, but not in the Rule 102(e)
definition. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e).
56. 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(b)(6)–(7). To cease their corrective actions, attorneys may rely on
the assertion of a colorable defense by some other attorney retained by the board of directors or
QLCC. Id. Professor Koniak interprets this section as creating a broad exemption requiring
only the imagination of, rather than the assertion of, a colorable defense. Koniak, supra note 14,
at 1275–77. It seems more consistent with the language, the regulatory scheme generally, and
the comments of the SEC to read the exemption narrowly as applying only during actual
assertion of a defense during investigations or litigations. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.2(b)(3) (defining
an appropriate response to an attorney’s report as “retain[ing] or direct[ing] an attorney to
review the reported evidence of a material violation and . . . such attorney may, consistent with
his or her professional obligations, assert a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer . . . in any
investigation or judicial or administrative proceeding”); Part 205 Release, supra note 5, at 6300
n.37 (“[A]sserting a colorable defense on an issuer’s behalf in an investigation or administrative
proceeding may constitute an appropriate response.”). Furthermore, Professor Koniak’s
analysis does not recognize that if an attorney has been retained by the board or QLCC to
imagine a colorable defense to a possible violation, then the board or QLCC has been informed
of the possible violation. The logical purpose of a reporting requirement is to make the recipient
of the report aware of the information reported. Thus, retention of an attorney by the board or
QLCC indicates that the board or QLCC is aware of the problem necessitating such retention,
which appears to fulfill the purpose of the reporting requirement. The role of the CLO and
QLCC are further discussed infra notes 119–22.
57. Part 205 Proposal, supra note 31, at 71,676.
58. To be sure, Model Rule 1.13, unlike Part 205, would apply to an attorney representing a
small business or other entity that never even considered the possibility of filing documents with
the SEC. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2002) (extending the obligations of
the Rule to all attorneys representing an organization). Even leaving aside the inadvisability of
such a negligent approach, this Note focuses on the responsibilities of securities lawyers, making
this distinction largely irrelevant to the discussion.
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capacity as attorneys, but the SEC in its final rules retreated from
59
this position.
B. What Triggers the Duty to Take a Corrective Action?
The three preexisting regimes further differ with respect to what
knowledge and actions are required of an attorney before he is
obligated to take a corrective action. Rule 10b-5 is subject to the
greatest ambiguity in its triggering mechanism, but may be the most
permissive. Rule 10b-5 violations take two forms: primary violations and
aiding and abetting violations.60 To commit a primary violation under
Rule 10b-5, a lawyer would have to make a material misstatement or
61
omission in the face of a duty to disclose. To commit an aiding and
abetting violation under Rule 10b-5, a lawyer would have to take some
action to specifically and substantially assist a primary violation by
another party, usually an officer or director of the represented entity.62 No
Rule 10b-5 violation, either primary or aiding and abetting, exists where
the conduct in question is merely negligent; some element of scienter must
exist.63 Finally, the deception must be material; that is, it must be
sufficiently important so as to “alter[] the ‘total mix’ of information made
64
available” to an investor. Thus, in either the primary or the aiding and
abetting case, it is clear that a lawyer must knowingly participate in a
material deception to violate Rule 10b-5.
59. Part 205 Release, supra note 5, at 6298.
60. Compare Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001) (applying a
primary violator test to secondary actors), with SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996)
(applying elements of aiding and abetting violations).
61. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977). There is some debate over
whether the misstatement or omission must be publicly attributable to a secondary actor to
establish that actor’s primary violation of Rule 10b-5. Compare Wright v. Ernst & Young L.L.P.,
152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that, in order for a secondary actor to incur primary
liability, “the misrepresentation must be attributed to that specific actor at the time of public
dissemination”), with Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324,
1334 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (holding that primary liability is not limited “to those individuals who sign
documents or are otherwise identified to investors”).
62. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104(2), 109 Stat.
737, 757 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (2000)). After Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), the degree of liability differs sharply for
primary and aiding and abetting violations, a distinction discussed infra Part II.D.
63. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212–14 (1976).
64. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). There are other elements
of a Rule 10b-5 violation, most notably reliance, Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988),
and standing, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730–31 (1975). However,
these are beyond the control of an attorney, whose decisions and responsibilities must therefore
rest on other grounds.
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In effect, lawyers first becoming aware of a material deception
are required under Rule 10b-5 to avoid: (1) making a misstatement in
furtherance of the deception, (2) if under a duty to disclose, failing to
correct a material omission, and (3) assisting in furtherance of the
65
deception. As a practical matter, however, a lawyer becoming aware
of a deception is probably being asked to do exactly one of these
three things. Therefore, the triggering mechanism for some
affirmative corrective action on the part of the lawyer is simply
awareness of a deception and a request by the client to further that
deception.
However, despite the apparent simplicity of this standard, courts
diverge sharply on what kinds of behavior give rise to the duty to act
66
preventatively. At one extreme stands Schatz v. Rosenberg. In
Schatz, the law firm Weinberg & Green knew of numerous
misrepresentations made to the plaintiffs and of a continuing scheme
to siphon off the resources of companies whose debt was held by the
67
plaintiffs. The facts of the case were anonymously submitted to
Maryland’s State Bar Committee on Ethics, which concluded that
Weinberg & Green had an ethical duty to either disclose the true
facts or withdraw from representing the client.68 Nonetheless, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the firm had no legal duty
to disclose, relieving Weinberg & Green of primary violator liability
under 10b-5.69 Further, the Fourth Circuit held that the absence of a
duty to disclose mandated a heightened standard of scienter for aider
and abettor liability.70 Thus, under the standard described in Schatz,
only a request for active, affirmative participation in the fraud would
trigger a duty to take corrective action.
71
At the other end of the spectrum stands SEC v. Frank. In that
case, Frank, an attorney, had seen some letters concerning tests of a
65. See, e.g., Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263, 268 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[The
attorney] assumes a duty to provide complete and nonmisleading information with respect to
subjects on which he undertakes to speak.”); SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d at 1293–94 (imposing liability
on a lawyer who edited a disclosure statement for failing to correct material omissions).
66. 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991).
67. Id. at 488.
68. Id. at 492.
69. Id. (“An ethical duty of disclosure does not create a corresponding legal duty under the
federal securities laws.”).
70. Id. at 496. This holding spurred one commentator to label the Schatz decision as
“clearly wrong.” Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer Liability in Third Party Situations: The
Meaning of the Kaye Scholer Case, 26 AKRON L. REV. 395, 400 n.17 (1993).
71. 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
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chemical additive designed to reduce the curing time of rubber
72
products. Some of these letters, and some comments made to Frank,
may have indicated that use of the additive sometimes resulted in
“sulphur bloom” and could not be guaranteed to work in all
instances.73 Frank helped to edit and circulate an offering statement
that claimed, among other things, extensive and successful testing of
74
the additive. The SEC successfully sued for an injunction against
Frank on the basis of a section 10(b) violation.75 The Second Circuit
held that a lawyer could not circulate information “simply because his
client has furnished it to him,” and that Frank had a duty not to
circulate the statement to the extent that he, as a layman, could
76
reasonably detect misrepresentations. The court further left open
the possibility that a lawyer might have an affirmative duty to
investigate possible discrepancies.77 Under this standard, even
knowledge of evidence of deceptions would serve to trigger a duty to
take corrective action. The precise level of attorney knowledge
required to trigger Rule 10b-5’s duties of corrective action thus varies
widely from the permissive standard in Schatz to the highly stringent
standard of Frank.

72. Id. at 489.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 487.
75. Id. The decision does not specify whether the SEC was pursuing a theory of primary or
aiding and abetting liability. This is not surprising, as prior to Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), the distinction between the two
theories was poorly defined. See James D. Cox, Just Deserts for Accountants and Attorneys after
Bank of Denver, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 519, 521 (1996) (“There is reason to believe that after Bank
of Denver courts will reconsider the liability of professionals as primary participants, even
though prior to Bank of Denver their liability was customarily regarded as that of an aider and
abettor to their client’s violation.”).
76. Frank, 388 F.2d at 489; see also Kline v. First W. Gov’t Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 487 (3d
Cir. 1994) (“[P]rofessionals and others with similar access to information must disclose data that
calls into question the accuracy of an opinion.”).
77. Frank, 388 F.2d at 489; cf. SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C.
1978) (holding that where attorney was on notice of possible infirmities of financial statements,
attorney was required to delay closing until the financial statements could be verified). Some
cases based on state fraud laws may go even further. See FDIC v. O’Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d
744, 748–49 (9th Cir. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), adopted in relevant part,
61 F.3d 17 (9th Cir. 1995) (imposing a duty under state law for a lawyer to “act competently to
avoid public harm when he learns that his is a dishonest client” and to conduct a “reasonable,
independent investigation” of facts given him by the client).
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Rule 102(e) theoretically imposes a triggering event similar to that
of Frank. In In re Carter & Johnson,79 the SEC prospectively created a
rule that where an attorney’s advice is not being followed or is not being
sought in good faith, the attorney is required to take corrective action.80
This standard is analytically distinct from the Second Circuit’s holding in
Frank, but as a practical matter may not differ much. Presumably, an
attorney who notices evidence of a misrepresentation will first approach
his client with advice before taking any more drastic corrective actions,
and will proceed to such actions only after being rebuffed. In the end,
however, the SEC’s use of its prosecutorial discretion to refrain from
pursuing Rule 102(e) actions in the absence of a judicial determination
of a violation of the securities laws81 has rendered the precise scope of
Rule 102(e) unimportant.
The Model Rules, however, do impose a broader set of triggering
events, at least in some instances. Model Rule 1.13 states
unequivocally that when a lawyer represents an organization, the
82
organizational entity, and not its constituents, is the client.
Analytically, this would imply that where the lawyer knows that an
officer or director, or any group thereof, is pursuing a course of action
likely to be harmful to the corporation, the lawyer has a duty to
prevent that course of action or, failing that, to limit its
83
consequences. This is indeed the standard set forth in Model Rule
84
1.13, though it is subject to two important qualifications. First,
Model Rule 1.13 contains a materiality standard, which requires that
the violative activity be likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization.85 This standard is similar in degree, though not in focus,
to the “significant propensity to affect [investors]” materiality
86
standard in Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence. The second qualification is an
78. Rule 102(e) was originally numbered as Rule 2(e), Rules of Practice, Exchange Act
Release No. 35,833, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,738, 32,822 (June 23, 1995), and many of the sources cited
in this Note refer to the latter.
79. In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847
(March 25, 1981).
80. Id. at 84,172.
81. See discussion supra note 31 and accompanying text.
82. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2002).
83. George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure to
Prevent Harm to Organizational Clients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597, 638 (1998).
84. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b).
85. Id.
86. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976) (quoting Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970)).
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ambiguous scienter requirement. Model Rule 1.13 mandates
87
corrective action when the attorney “knows” of violations, but no
guidance is given in either the Rule or its comments as to whether
actual knowledge is required, or whether a recklessness standard, or
even a negligence standard, applies. Notwithstanding this ambiguity,
the Rule 1.13 trigger is significantly broader than any interpretation
of Rule 10b-5, as it encompasses not only deceptive practices, but also
any violation of law likely to cause the organization substantial harm.
However, the actions that a lawyer may take under Rule 1.13 are
88
limited to in-house, corrective actions. Rule 1.16 also includes a
triggering event for withdrawal from representation when continued
89
representation would result in violation of the law or ethical duties.
The language of Rule 1.16 is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the
representation itself must violate the law to trigger the duty to
withdraw, or whether it is sufficient that the representation will assist
violation of the law.90 The comments shed some light on this
91
ambiguity, but do not resolve it. Comment 2 to Rule 1.16 states that
withdrawal is mandated when the client demands that the lawyer
engage in illegal conduct.92 On the other hand, comment 15 to Rule
1.6 and comment 10 to Rule 1.2 state that withdrawal under Rule
1.16(a)(1) is required when the lawyer’s services will be used to
further or assist criminal or fraudulent conduct.93 The distinction is
akin to that between primary violations and aiding and abetting
94
violations of Rule 10b-5, but is dissimilar in that the primary route is
triggered by any violation of law or professional responsibility, while
the indirect route is triggered only by criminal or
fraudulent behavior.95

87. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b).
88. Id.
89. Id. R. 1.16(a)(1).
90. Rule 1.16 reads in relevant part that “a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if the
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law.” Id.
91. Comments to the Model Rules are guides for interpretation, but the text of the rules is
authoritative. Id., Scope, ¶ 21.
92. Id. R. 1.16 cmt.
93. Id. R. 1.2 cmt., 1.6 cmt.
94. See discussion supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
95. One area of the Model Rules not immediately relevant to this discussion is that of
permissive triggers for corrective action, especially withdrawal. There are a number of
circumstances that permit, but do not require, the withdrawal of the attorney. These include an
attorney’s reasonable belief that the client’s course of action is criminal or fraudulent, past use

010904 SONG.DOC

272

01/30/04 9:04 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:257

Turning to Part 205, one sees that it has adopted the most
expansive components of the preexisting regimes. Part 205 first
repeats the principle, also found in Model Rule 1.13(a) and with
similar implications, that when representing an organization, the
96
client is the organization and not its constituents. It then requires an
attorney to take corrective action whenever he becomes aware of
evidence of a material violation of the securities laws or of a fiduciary
duty.97 The concept of “evidence of a material violation” is
confusingly defined as “credible evidence, based upon which it would
be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and
competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a
98
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.”
This definition seems to merge the triggering events of section 10(b),
Rule 102(e), and Model Rule 1.13, expanding upon each. First,
materiality remains an element that, although not defined in Part 205,
is presumably comparable to the similar standards of both section
10(b) and the Model Rules.99 Second, the level of knowledge
required, stripped of its double negative, is awareness of information
100
that would lead a prudent attorney to believe that a violation exists,

of an attorney’s services to perpetrate a crime or fraud, distaste for client objectives, or
unreasonable difficulty or financial burden in the attorney-client relationship. MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b). However, since these rules are permissive, they are not
apposite to the discussion of attorney responsibilities. These provisions are discussed again
briefly in the context of noisy withdrawal, infra Part II.C.2.
96. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(a) (2003); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a).
97. 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(b)(1). Ethical violations do not require corrective action under Part
205. Id.
98. Id. pt. 205.2(e).
99. In securities law, “materiality” is a central term of art that has a consistent meaning
across all areas and usages. COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 39–40 (2001). There is no reason to think that its usage in Part 205 was
accidental or intended to have a different interpretation.
100. 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.2(e). Professor Koniak interprets this language differently, arguing
that the standard is equivalent in practice to an actual knowledge standard, because, in practice,
the factfinder tasked with finding actual knowledge must determine “what any reasonable
person would have to have known in this situation.” Koniak, supra note 14, at 1275–76.
However, a subjective standard does not hinge on what a reasonable person would have to have
known; rather, it hinges on what that particular person in fact knew. Furthermore, although it is
certainly possible to read the double negative as heightening the triggering standard beyond the
Frank level, this reading would be inconsistent with the term “prudent,” repeated use of the
concept of “reasonable,” a generally accepted term of art indicating an objective standard, and
accompanying SEC comments. 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.2(e); see Part 205 Release, supra note 5, at
6301–02. Professor Koniak also attributes the poor drafting of this section to political
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a standard that mirrors the expansive Frank interpretation of Rule
101
10b-5. The concept of a prudent attorney implies an objective,
negligence-like standard of knowledge, which suggests a broader
scope of triggering events than does Model Rule 1.13’s ambiguous
standard of knowledge. In requiring only a level of knowledge, and
no action, Part 205 is also analytically broader than Rule 102(e).
Third and finally, the scope of qualifying violations includes not only
the securities violations contemplated by Rule 10b-5 and Rule
102(e),102 but also fiduciary duties.103 For practical purposes, this scope
is nearly coextensive with that of Model Rule 1.13.104 Part 205 thus
combines the most expansive notions of triggering events from each
of these regimes. In this sense, although no piece of the Part 205
standard is without precedent, Part 205 as a whole is broader than any
preceding legal regime.
C. What Corrective Actions Are Required or Permitted?
Once the duty to take corrective action is triggered in any of the
legal regimes discussed in this Part, a lawyer’s next step is to
determine what corrective actions are required. Several of the
regimes provide for significant discretion in this step. The SEC’s
interpretation of Rule 102(e), for example, requires “further, more
affirmative steps in order to avoid the inference that he has been coopted, willingly or unwillingly, into the scheme of non-disclosure,”
but recognizes that “[t]he lawyer is in the best position to choose his

compromises essentially designed to give the appearance of a stricter standard while actually
permitting the bar free rein. Koniak, supra note 14, at 1276–77. With all respect to Professor
Koniak, it seems more reasonable to attribute the unarguably poor drafting to the immense
number of regulations the SEC had to produce in an extremely short period of time. SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 §§ 101(d), 208(a), 301, 302(c), 303(d), 307, 401(a), 401(b), 406(d), 407(c),
802(a), 116 Stat. 745, 751, 775, 776, 777–78, 778, 784, 786, 786–87, 789–80, 790, 800 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003)).
101. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968); see discussion supra notes 71–77 and
accompanying text.
102. Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Contrivances, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003);
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 104(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (2000); In re Carter
& Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at 84,172 (March 25,
1981). Only the latter two sources explicitly contemplate the full range of securities violations,
but as mentioned in note 11, supra, Rule 10b-5 is to some degree a conceptual representative of
the securities laws generally.
103. 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.2(e).
104. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2002) (covering fiduciary duties
and violations of securities law under the rubric of any “violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization”).
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105
next step.” Similarly, Rule 10b-5 cases, regardless of where they fall
on the spectrum of the scope of trigger conditions, are largely silent
on what a lawyer may do, except for stating that the lawyer must not
take any action to perpetrate or substantially assist a deception.106
This requirement, combined with the silence on any specific actions,
may imply a preference for resignation. Although they are far more
specific in their requirements for corrective action, the Model Rules
also include a number of permissive rules allowing significant
107
attorney discretion.
Part 205, in contrast, is highly specific and offers very little
108
discretion to the attorney. It prescribes a rigorous, step-by-step path
of corrective actions for attorneys to follow, and only permits
discretion in specific circumstances that may justify disclosure of
client confidences.109 In addition to this up-the-ladder reporting, the
SEC also considered further noisy withdrawal requirements.110 The
following Sections consider these devices.

1. Up-the-Ladder Reporting and Monitoring. The obligation to
report the actions of corporate constituents to their superiors, known
as up-the-ladder reporting,111 had little formal basis in case law or
legal academic literature prior to the corporate derailments that led

105. In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 84,172.
106. See Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001) (refusing to
impose primary Rule 10b-5 liability where no misstatement relied on by plaintiffs could be
identified); Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 460–61 (8th Cir. 1991) (using a severe recklessness test
to determine whether attorneys’ actions constituted substantial assistance of the primary
violation for the purposes of Rule 10b-5). But see SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F.
Supp. 682, 713 (D.D.C. 1978) (imposing on attorneys a duty to shareholders to interfere with the
consummation of a merger until financial statements brought into question by a “comfort
letter” could be verified).
107. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (requiring that a “lawyer shall
proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization” and suggesting
referral to higher authority “unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the
best interest of the organization”); id. R. 1.6 cmt. (permitting but not requiring disclosure of
client confidences to prevent or rectify crime or fraud).
108. Part 205 primarily gives responsibilities to “supervisory” attorneys, and allows
“subordinate” attorneys to simply report evidence of a material violation to their supervising
attorney and cease their efforts there. 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.4–.5. Because this distinction does not
change the overall structure of the regulatory scheme, this Note will address only the more
stringent “supervisory” requirements.
109. Id. pt. 205.3.
110. Part 205 Proposal, supra note 31, at 71,688–91. Noisy Withdrawal Proposal, supra note
42, at 6326.
111. Part 205 Release, supra note 5, at 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003).
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to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Commentary since then
has identified either Rule 102(e), as interpreted by In re Carter &
112
113
Johnson, or Model Rule 1.13(b) as the source of the concept.
Up-the-ladder reporting is certainly present in both of these
rules, but the recommendation to pursue such reporting is weak in
both cases. In re Carter & Johnson, as mentioned above, gives lawyers
114
a free rein to deal with a client who is ignoring their advice. Rather
than dictating a precise course of conduct, it merely provides three
suggestions: resignation, direct approach to the board of directors, or
enlisting the aid of other managers.115 Of these, only directly
approaching the board of directors is analogous to up-the-ladder
reporting, while enlisting the aid of managers is similar in spirit but
not operation. Model Rule 1.13 is similarly merely suggestive. It first
gives a general mandate to proceed as necessary in the best interests
of the organization while minimizing disruption.116 It then suggests as
nonexclusive examples the following options: requesting
reconsideration, advising a second legal opinion, or referring the
matter to higher authority, potentially up to the highest authority, in
the organization.117 This latter option is more explicitly similar to upthe-ladder reporting, but the suggestion is weakened even further by
the preceding admonition to minimize disruption to the client
organization. There are few organizations where accusing a CEO of
questionable conduct before the board of directors will not create
significant organizational disruption.
These meek suggestions stand in stark contrast to the mandate
for up-the-ladder reporting set forth by section 307 and implemented
in Part 205. Under the new regulations, an attorney who becomes

112. E.g., Part 205 Proposal, supra note 31, at 71,671–72. The SEC also cited In re
Gutfreund, Strauss & Meriwether, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,067
(Dec. 3, 1992), as an example of a recommendation of up-the-ladder reporting outside the Rule
102(e) context. Part 205 Proposal, supra note 31, at 71,672.
113. E.g., Letter from Richard W. Painter to Harvey Pitt, Chairman, SEC (Mar. 7, 2002),
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/pitt.pdf (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
114. In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at
84,172 (March 25, 1981).
115. Id.
116. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2002).
117. Id. Note that the first suggestion here would have already been exhausted by a lawyer
facing a choice governed by In re Carter & Johnson. The Rule 102(e) triggering event includes
being repeatedly rebuffed by the client, and such rebuffs could only have come in response to a
lawyer’s request for reconsideration.
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aware of evidence of a material violation has two reporting paths that
118
he may follow. First, he may report the evidence to the CLO or to
119
both the CLO and chief executive officer (CEO). If he does not
receive an appropriate response within a reasonable time, he must
then report the evidence to the audit committee or, if no audit
committee exists, to another committee composed entirely of
directors not employed by the company or, if no such committee
exists, to the full board of directors.120 Alternatively, if the company
121
has established a qualified legal compliance committee (QLCC), the
122
attorney may simply report the evidence to the QLCC. Part 205 has
borrowed a suggested corrective action and turned it into a rigorous
regulation.
Up-the-ladder reporting can clearly be quite burdensome for an
outside lawyer, and perhaps even more so for an in-house lawyer.
However good his reasons are for doing so, an outside lawyer who
appears before the board regularly to tell them of more evidence of
violations is likely to lose that company’s business. To be sure, an inhouse lawyer could not be terminated for complying with his legal
123
duties, but “ratting” on peers tends to lead to an unpleasant
working environment and to foreclose many possibilities of career
advancement.
Adding to this burden, significant monitoring duties may be
implicitly imposed by Part 205. Specifically, an attorney who makes a
report under the up-the-ladder requirement does not escape liability
until the officer makes an appropriate response within a reasonable
124
time. Thus, unless the attorney is reporting to a QLCC, he must
follow every report by monitoring the passage of time and assessing
the reasonableness of any response under an elaborate and complex
standard.125 It can be argued, of course, that any up-the-ladder system,
118. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(b), (c) (2003).
119. Id. pt. 205.3(b)(1).
120. Id. pt. 205.3(b)(4).
121. A QLCC is a committee of directors tasked with investigating evidence of material
violations. Id. pt. 205.2(k). It is composed of at least one audit committee member and at least
two directors not employed by the company and not “interested persons” as that term is defined
by the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (2000). 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.2(k).
An existing committee whose members meet these requirements may serve as the QLCC. Id.
122. Id. pt. 205.3(c).
123. Id. pt. 205.3(b)(10).
124. Id. pt. 205.3(b)(3).
125. Id. pt. 205.2(b), (c).
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such as that suggested by In re Carter & Johnson or Model Rule 1.13,
necessarily includes some duty to monitor the results to determine
when the next step must be taken. But this argument overlooks the
true import of the monitoring requirement, which is the deprivation
of security for an attorney. The up-the-ladder suggestions of the preSarbanes-Oxley regimes were accompanied by the granting of wide
discretion to attorneys, so that any corrective action would largely
126
shield them from liability. Under Part 205, however, attorneys who
take corrective action by reporting up to a CLO must subsequently
127
make a series of additional judgment calls, possibly including
assessment of business judgments, expert credibility, and colorable
defenses. These assessments are well beyond the scope of the
traditional practice of securities law and thus impose significant new
burdens on the attorney. Indeed, in the case of business judgments,
corporate law jurisprudence has long recognized that the bar is not
well suited to make or second-guess these judgments.128
2. Noisy Withdrawal. Noisy withdrawal, although much more
controversial than up-the-ladder reporting, has a significant basis in
129
Simple resignation is
legal academic and practice literature.
126. See discussion supra notes 105–07, 114–17and accompanying text.
127. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.2(b)(3) (requiring attorney to assess implementation of remedial
recommendations, reasonableness of the investigation, and quality of proposed defenses). One
potential objection to this characterization of the attorney’s burden is that Part 205 does offer a
safe harbor even more secure than discretion, in the form of the QLCC. Id. pt. 205.3(c).
However, this overlooks the problem that the decision to form the QLCC rests with the
company, not the attorney. See id. Thus, unless attorneys collectively have sufficient market
power to demand that their clients form QLCCs many securities lawyers will continue to find
themselves with exactly the burden described here. But see Letter from Susan P. Koniak to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 17, 2002), available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s74502/spkoniak1.htm (on file with Duke Law Journal) (opining that the majority of companies
will promptly form QLCCs).
128. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (stating that it is
“beyond our jurisdiction and ability” to review whether corporate directors made a correct
business decision); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“The judges are
not business experts.”).
129. E.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 366, at 3 (1992)
(approving noisy withdrawal when a lawyer’s continued representation will perpetrate fraud);
H. Lowell Brown, The Dilemma of Corporate Counsel Faced with Client Misconduct: Disclosure
of Client Confidences or Constructive Discharge, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 777, 819–24 (1996)
(discussing whether noisy withdrawal would have been permissible or appropriate in the Kaye
Scholer incident discussed infra note 166); Lisa H. Nicholson, A Hobson’s Choice for Securities
Lawyers in the Post-Enron Environment: Striking a Balance Between the Obligation of Client
Loyalty and Market Gatekeeper, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 91, 129–34 (2002) (examining the
disclosure and duty problems surrounding the precise timing of a noisy withdrawal).
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frequently considered an alternative to participation in or furtherance
130
of a course of action to which an attorney cannot reconcile himself.
In a noisy withdrawal, however, an attorney goes further than simply
resigning by notifying third parties of his resignation and publicly
disaffirming some or all of his work product.131 Noisy withdrawal has
its strongest roots in the Model Rules, as it is essentially a
compromise between a lawyer’s ethical duty of client confidentiality
and his duty to avoid assisting a client in a criminal or fraudulent
132
course of action. In this sense, it is a highly artificial device that
effectively informs third parties that the client may be engaged in
questionable activity while permitting the lawyer to technically
maintain client confidences.133
The text of the Model Rules at no time mentions noisy
withdrawal or disaffirmance of work product. However, while Model
Rule 1.6 sets forth the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality, comment 14 to
that Rule explicitly contemplates and permits giving notice of a
withdrawal and disaffirmance of opinions, documents, and
134
affirmations. Comments to Model Rules 1.2 and 4.1 further clarify
that such measures are justified where necessary to prevent assisting a
135
client’s ongoing crime or fraud. The ABA has offered a further
interpretation of the Model Rules through a formal ethics opinion
issued in 1992.136 In that opinion, the ABA concluded that if a client is
perpetrating an ongoing fraud, an attorney has to resign and is
permitted to disaffirm any work product he believes is being or will be

130. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (2002) (permitting
withdrawal in various specific situations where the attorney and client can no longer agree or
work together).
131. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 366, at 3 (1992).
132. Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d), R. 1.6, R. 1.16(d).
133. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 366, at 7 n.9 (“[A]
‘noisy’ withdrawal may result in a disclosure of ‘information relating to representation’ that is
generally prohibited by [Model] Rule 1.6.”). Many commentators have taken the position
instead that the Model Rules are simply incorrect in disallowing disclosure of constituent
activity harmful to the corporation, before or after resignation. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Model
Rule 1.13(c) Gives the Wrong Answer to the Question of Corporate Counsel Disclosure, 1 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 289, 295–97 (1987) (analyzing the distinctions between corporate clients and
identically situated, individual clients to highlight the ethical difficulties for corporate lawyers);
Harris, supra note 83, at 639 (analogizing activities of corporate constituents that harm the
corporation to activities of a guardian that harm his ward).
134. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt.
135. Id. R. 1.2 cmt., R. 4.1 cmt.
136. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 366 (1992).
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used to perpetrate the fraud, or as necessary to effect withdrawal. If,
however, the fraud is completed, resignation is permitted, but
138
disaffirmation is not. Thus, under the Model Rules and ABA
interpretation, the concept of noisy withdrawal exists, but it is
qualified by numerous conditions.139 Most notably, at no time is noisy
withdrawal mandated under the Model Rules.
As with up-the-ladder reporting and monitoring, a proposed
provision of Part 205 also takes the basic concept of a noisy
withdrawal and strengthens it. Under a provision currently tabled by
the SEC for further consideration, an outside lawyer who goes up the
ladder to the board of directors and still receives no satisfactory
response to an ongoing or future violation is required to resign, give
notice of the resignation to the SEC within one business day, and
140
promptly disaffirm any work product that may be misleading. An
inside lawyer is required to give notice of intent to disaffirm within
one business day, and similarly disaffirm his work product.141 If the
violation is completed, the lawyer is permitted, but not required, to
142
proceed in the same manner as if the violation were ongoing. An
alternative proposal advanced by the SEC would require an attorney
143
to withdraw but not to disaffirm work product. However, the client
entity would be required to notify the SEC of the attorney’s

137. Id. at 3.
138. Id.
139. Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2, R. 1.6. These restrictions may account
for the fact that in the last ten years, the ABA has approved noisy withdrawal as a response to
specific fact situations in only two other opinions. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 375, at 6 (1993) (approving noisy withdrawal to prevent bank
examiners from relying on a lawyer’s opinion where the lawyer discovered that his opinion was
predicated on false information); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op.
376, at 8 (1993) (discussing, and implicitly authorizing, noisy withdrawal in hypotheticals
involving false replies to discovery requests). Nonetheless, this is still the most expansive preSarbanes-Oxley view. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 366, at 3
(1992) (approving noisy withdrawal when a lawyer’s continued representation will perpetrate an
ongoing or future fraud). In contrast, In re Carter & Johnson discourages even simple
resignation except where continued representation would be utterly futile. See In re Carter &
Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at 84,172–73 (March 25,
1981) (“We would anticipate that cases where a lawyer has no choice but to resign would be
rare and of an egregious nature.”).
140. Noisy Withdrawal Proposal, supra note 42, at 6326. The comment period for this
proposal closed April 7, 2003, id. at 6324, but at the time of writing, the SEC had not yet
released any final rule or decision on noisy withdrawal.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 6326–27.
143. Id. at 6328.
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withdrawal, and should they not do so, the attorney would be
144
permitted to call attention to the deficiency. The purpose of the
change, like the purpose of the noisy withdrawal proposal, would
presumably be to alert the SEC to the possibility of wrongdoing while
technically not violating any client confidences. In light of this
purpose, it is important to note that the rule currently finalized by the
SEC with respect to QLCCs permits exposure of confidential client
information.145 Under these final rules, if the company has established
a QLCC and the reporting lawyer has chosen to report to the QLCC
instead of the CLO, then noisy withdrawal is neither mandated nor
permitted under Part 205.146 However, the QLCC itself has the
authority, but not the mandate, to notify the SEC if the corporation
does not make a reasonable response to the reported evidence of a
violation.147 Furthermore, an attorney may reveal any information to
the SEC as is reasonably necessary to prevent or rectify substantial
injury to the client or its investors, or to prevent perjury or other
fraud on the SEC.148 This ability to reveal information reaches
significantly farther than disaffirmation alone, essentially permitting
an attorney to make “noise” whenever the substantial injury test is
met.149 Interestingly, this rule is not tied to withdrawal in any way,
144. Id. at 6329–30.
145. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.2(k)(4) (2003). Of course, at
this time only the finalized rule applies, but the two proposed alternatives may be indicative of
future revisions to Part 205 or the enforcement direction of the SEC.
146. 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(b)–(c). On the surface, this may appear to provide companies with
some incentive to establish QLCCs to avoid potential embarrassment. However, such
embarrassment would be expected only in the unlikely case that the company expected to
continue obstinately in a course of action that its lawyers thought to be illegal. Furthermore,
QLCCs are also permitted, though not required, to report company inaction to the SEC. Id. pt.
205.2(k)(4). The incentive to establish QLCCs would thus have to come from some other
source.
147. 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.2(k).
148. 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(d)(2).
149. See id. (“An attorney . . . may reveal to the Commission . . . confidential information . . .
to the extent the attorney reasonably believes necessary: . . . [t]o prevent the issuer from
committing a material violation that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial interest
or property of the issuer or investors.”). The perjury or fraud on the SEC triggering test is more
properly analogized to Model Rule 3.3, which prohibits a lawyer making a false statement to a
tribunal or offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false. Compare 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(d)(2)
(identifying client perjury, subornation of perjury, and perpetration of fraud on the SEC as
warranting the revelation of confidential information by an attorney), with MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002) (requiring lawyers appearing before a tribunal who know that a
person intends to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct to take remedial measures, possibly
including disclosure to the tribunal). Although the focus of Model Rule 3.3 is largely
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though presumably withdrawal would be appropriate in many of the
situations to which this rule might apply.
Clearly, each of these regimes—the noisy withdrawal and
withdrawal-with-notice proposals and the finalized noisy QLCC and
client confidence rule—imply different, specific duties and different
degrees of modification from the prior, existing regimes. But common
ground between the regimes and the finalization of the client
confidence and noisy QLCC rules allow certain general conclusions
to be drawn. Specifically, these provisions expand on the Model Rules
in two ways. First, they reject the narrow crime or fraud trigger of the
Model Rules, allowing instead for the rule to be triggered by the
more liberal standard of any violation of securities law or duty, or in
the case of the client confidence rule, by a likelihood of substantial
150
injury. Second, the force of the device remains at least equal to the
Model Rules; where the Model Rules permit disaffirmance, Part 205
may require disaffirmance.151
D. What Enforcement Mechanisms Exist to Ensure Compliance?
Up to this point, the analysis has largely focused on the duties
imposed by each legal regime. However, the force of any rule is
determined in large part by the enforcement mechanism that stands
behind it. This Section will therefore examine the sanctions that
attach to an attorney’s failure to comply with his duties.
As discussed above, the Model Rules have broad triggering
mechanisms and are the source of many of the specific responsibilities
152
of lawyers, including up-the-ladder reporting and noisy withdrawal.
At the same time, although the Model Rules sometimes require
attorneys to take general action, specific failure to go up the ladder or
to execute a noisy withdrawal would never be a basis for
preventative, comments to the rule indicate that learning of the falsity of testimony later may
require disclosure of the falsehood to the tribunal. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
3.3 cmt. Here too, the Part 205 standard is significantly broader in that it requires only
reasonable belief of perjury, rather than actual knowledge that testimony is false. Part 205
Release, supra note 5, at 6305 (Feb. 6, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). A full discussion of
the effect of expanding Model Rule 3.3 is for the most part incidental to, and outside the scope
of, this Note.
150. See supra Part II.B.
151. See supra notes 133–48 and accompanying text.
152. See supra Part II.B. Rule 102(e) also mentions a form of up-the-ladder reporting, but as
its application is limited to cases where a securities violation has already been found, it is
unlikely to be an independent source of responsibility for an attorney. Appearance and Practice
Before the Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2003).
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153
enforcement. Rather, the Model Rules tend to be enforced only
when an attorney pursued corrective actions beyond the allowed
scope. Such influence on attorneys’ preventative responsibilities is
more limiting than enabling.154
In theory, the enforcement mechanism is fairly strong,
encompassing a number of disciplinary sanctions that include
155
reprimand, suspension, and disbarment. In practice, however, the
picture is less clear. Although no statistics are available for violations
of specific rules, a 2000 ABA survey shows that only 3.7 percent of
lawyers investigated by disciplinary committees for professional
responsibility violations are ever formally and publicly charged. Of
those charged, however, over one-fourth are voluntarily or
involuntarily disbarred.156 It is unclear whether this rate of
enforcement is sufficient to ensure broad compliance with the Model
Rules. In conjunction with the potentially limiting nature of
enforcement, it seems that the Model Rules are probably not a major
force pushing lawyers toward corrective action.
The odd enforcement status of Rule 102(e) has already been
mentioned here several times. Even on its face, Rule 102(e) has the
weakest (but certainly still nontrivial) sanctions of any of the regimes,
as it contemplates barring an attorney from all further practice before
157
158
the SEC. Given the broad definition of practicing before the SEC,
this is effectively a disbarment from the practice of securities law and
many forms of corporate law, though not from the practice of law
generally. The incentive effects of this sanction are even further
weakened due to the SEC’s policy of linking prosecution of Rule

153. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (permitting lawyers to reveal
confidential information to comply with the Model Rules but not detailing consequences of
failing to reveal confidential information when the Model Rules would require it); id. R. 1.6 cmt.
(detailing no sanctions for an attorney’s failure to comply with the withdrawal rules); id. R. 1.13
(permitting, but not requiring, lawyers to withdraw from representation of clients breaking the
law); id. R. 1.13 cmt. (justifying lawyer action when client is violating the law, but not
establishing punishment for failing to act).
154. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 366, at 3 (1992)
(outlining narrow circumstances in which an attorney should take corrective action).
155. MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 10 (2001).
156. See id. (showing 3,360 formal chargings); see also http://www.abanet.org/cpr/discipline/
sold/00-ch2.xls (last visited Oct. 26, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (showing 929
disbarments, of which 486 were involuntary and 443 were on consent).
157. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(i–iii).
158. See id. § 201.102(f) (defining practice before the SEC as transacting any business with
the Commission or preparing any document filed with it).
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102(e) actions to judicial determinations of violations of the
159
securities laws.
Sanctions associated with violations of Rule 10b-5 have much
more weight than either the Model Rules or Rule 102(e). How much
weight, exactly, depends in turn on whether the violation is a primary
160
or aiding and abetting violation. Modern securities aiding and
abetting violations are governed by section 20(f) of the Exchange
161
Act, which specifies that for actions brought by the SEC, an aider
and abettor is in violation to the same extent as the primary
violator.162 The range of possible noncriminal sanctions are thus those
provided by the Exchange Act: injunctions (in administrative
proceedings), cease-and-desist orders, or civil monetary penalties of
up to $100,000 for a natural person or $500,000 for an entity.163 These
are clearly more serious penalties than those contemplated by the
164
Model Rules or Rule 102(e). Injunctions can be used to bar
attorneys, as with Rule 102(e), from further practice before the
165
166
SEC; cease-and-desist orders can bring entire law firms to a halt,
167
and the money damages are significant.
Nonetheless, aiders and abettors are exposed to significantly less
168
risk than primary violators of Rule 10b-5. Primary violators are

159. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
160. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994)
(permitting private actions, including recovery of damages, for primary violations, but blocking
such actions for aiding and abetting violations). But see 15 U.S.C. § 78t (2000) (imposing joint
and several liability on aiders and abettors).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f).
162. Id.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d).
164. ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 10 (2003);
Appearance and Practice Before the Commission, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.102(e)(1), 201.102(f) (2003).
165. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1296 (9th Cir. 1997) (enjoining a lawyer
permanently “from future aiding and abetting violations of sections 10(b) and 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934”).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d). The cease and desist power generated great alarm among lawyers
when it was used by the Office of Thrift Supervision against Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays and
Handler in 1992. See Hazard, supra note 70, at 397–98 (discussing the bar’s “anxious attention”
and reaction to the Kaye Scholer cease-and-desist order); Peter C. Kostant, When Zeal Boils
Over: Disclosure Obligations and the Duty of Candor of Legal Counsel in Regulatory
Proceedings After the Kaye Scholer Settlement, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 487, 492–93 (1993) (chronicling
Kaye Scholer’s failure to meet appropriate standards of professional conduct). The cease-anddesist order froze all assets of the firm and halted business for ten days, at which point Kaye
Scholer agreed to a $41 million settlement. Id. at 487–89.
167. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d).
168. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
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subject to all the same Exchange Act penalties, but are further subject
169
to private litigation for civil damages. In light of Central Bank of
170
Denver, however, it is natural to ask how likely it is that an attorney
would be found liable for a primary violation, rather than an aiding
and abetting violation. Justice Stevens provides one answer in his
dissent: “Indeed, the Court anticipates . . . that many aiders and
abettors will be subject to liability as primary violators. For example,
an accountant, lawyer, or other person making oral or written
misrepresentations . . . may be liable for a primary violation.”171
Although the primary liability test is unquestionably more stringent
than the aiding and abetting test,172 several courts have reiterated that
173
secondary actors can be primarily liable under Rule 10b-5. The
debate now seems to center around whether the attorney must make
a public misstatement or omission, or whether substantial
participation in a deception is sufficient.174 In other words, the
attorney’s duty once he becomes aware of the deception is narrow: he
must either not make a misstatement or not participate in a
deception, depending on which test applies. In either case, this
narrow duty is strongly enforced by the threat of both SEC and
private litigation.
Part 205 is not as strongly enforced as Rule 10b-5. Instead,
sanctions are directly equated to the sanctions that would apply for a
violation of the Exchange Act, but the criminal penalties available
164, 191 (1994) (refusing to recognize a private cause of action for aiding and abetting
violations); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730, 755 (1975) (refusing to
grant private causes of action to anyone other than buyers and sellers of securities).
169. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
170. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
171. Id. at 199 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. See David J. Baum, Comment, The Aftermath of Central Bank of Denver: Private
Aiding and Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1817, 1839
(1995) (predicting a significant drop in secondary actor litigation due to the reduced likelihood
of recovery).
173. See, e.g., Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 1998)
(imposing liability on an attorney who withheld material information from investors); see also
Kline v. First W. Gov’t Sec., 24 F.3d 480, 492–93 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that lawyers have “a
duty not to omit” because “ethical rules cannot be relied on to perpetrate fraud”). In a case with
more public visibility, if less precedential value, Judge Melinda Harmon recently issued an
extensive and thoughtful ruling denying a motion to dismiss filed by Enron’s accountants and
auditors in a class action suit against them. Newby v. Enron Corp., No. H-01-3624, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7632 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2002).
174. See Robert A. Prentice, Locating That “Indistinct” and “Virtually Nonexistent” Line
Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691, 723–26
(1997) (outlining the “broad” and “narrow” views of attorney liability under section 10(b)).
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175
under the Exchange Act are specifically excluded. Thus, sanctions
would be available for a violation of an attorney’s duties under Part
205 to the same extent that civil sanctions would be available for an
aiding and abetting violation of Rule 10b-5.176 The initial proposal of
Part 205 engendered widespread concern that there might be room
for additional enforcement in the form of a court finding an implied
private right of action.177 However, the SEC in its final release
reformed the language of several sections to eliminate possible bases
for such a right, and added an explicit prohibition on private rights of
action on the basis of section 307 or Part 205.178 Although this does
not completely preclude a court from implying a private right of
179
action, it does make it exceedingly unlikely. In any case, Part 205’s
enforcement scheme is certainly at least as strong as any of the legal
regimes discussed above, other than for private Rule 10b-5 violations
and criminal aiding and abetting.

III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In light of the foregoing, Part 205 can be simplistically
summarized as an amalgamation of many of the most expansive
notions of lawyer responsibility to be found in our legal system prior
to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Informed by this
understanding, one is better able to return to the fundamental
175. See Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before
the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.6(a) (2003) (defining
sanctions as “civil penalties and remedies”); Part 205 Release, supra note 5, at 6305, 6314–15
(Feb. 6, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
176. Compare 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.6(a) (establishing civil penalties), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)
(2000) (granting courts authority to enjoin acts that violate securities laws, prohibit people from
serving as officers and directors, or collect fines).
177. See Part 205 Release, supra note 5, at 6305, 6314–15 (addressing various commenters’
concern that a private right of action might be implied). This concern was probably unfounded
even with respect to the rules’ original form in light of the Supreme Court’s current distaste for
implying private rights of action. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001)
(articulating the modern restrictive standard for implying private rights of action).
178. 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.7; Part 205 Release, supra note 5, at 6315.
179. Legislative history further supports the conclusion that no private right of action should
be implied. Senator John Edwards, the primary author of section 307, stated in debate that
“nothing in this bill gives anybody a right to file a private lawsuit against anybody.” 148 CONG.
REC. S6524, 6552 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards). But as the then-general
counsel of the SEC once cynically remarked: “As near as I can tell, the basic holding, or the
fundamental holding, of Central Bank really is that legislative history doesn’t matter. The
fundamental holding of Gustafson [v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995),] is that statutory
language doesn’t matter much either.” Simon Lorne, Comment on “Just Deserts for
Accountants,” 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 555, 555 (1996).
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question: What are the broader economic, professional, and societal
implications of the new regulatory scheme? Because many scholars
180
have already explored this topic, this Note will limit itself to brief
observations suggested by the analytical model discussed in Part II.
This Part argues that Part 205’s expansion of lawyer regulation along
each dimension impacts a different aspect of a lawyer’s perceived role
in corporate governance and works a fundamental change to existing
models of the role of the securities lawyer.
First, expanding the reach of Part 205’s extensive duties and
sanctions may seriously interfere with traditional notions of zealous
advocacy expected of a lawyer. Part 205 reaches all attorneys
practicing before the SEC, including those involved in adversarial
enforcement proceedings or nominally cooperative but fundamentally
181
adversarial investigations. A lawyer who must zealously advocate
his client’s position while simultaneously being on the lookout for
material evidence of a violation may, despite the SEC’s colorable
defense exemption, find himself in an untenable position.182 For
example, an attorney doing his best to draft a Wells submission
defending internal controls183 could easily come upon evidence of a
related breach of Caremark duties that he would then have to report
184
up and potentially out.
Second, as perhaps the most obvious and potentially most
profound impact of Part 205, the lowered triggering standards may
fundamentally change the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client
185
but the
relationship. Part 205 recognizes this fiduciary role,
180. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
181. 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.2(a).
182. See Letter from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom, LLP, to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, SEC (Apr. 1, 2003) (opining that requiring documentation of reporting while
advocating a defense places attorneys in an untenable position), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s74502/skadden1.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
183. A Wells submission is essentially a response to an SEC Staff recommendation that an
enforcement action be initiated. Arthur B. Laby & W. Hardy Callcott, Patterns of SEC
Enforcement Under the 1990 Remedies Act: Civil Money Penalties, 58 ALB. L. REV. 5, 8 n.21
(1994). However, drafting a Wells submission can be quite sensitive, because at the time of
drafting the attorney would not be aware of the nature or basis for the recommendation, and as
an advocate would not want to reveal or characterize damaging evidence in ways that the staff
has not thought of.
184. Caremark duties refer to Delaware law fiduciary duties to maintain a system of internal
controls on management and employees. In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959,
968–70 (Del. Ch. 1996). Thus, the duty to reveal or report evidence relevant to a Caremark
violation could seriously hamper the sensitive drafting of a Wells submission on a similar topic.
185. See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 521 (2002)
(likening the lawyer-client relationship to the parent-child relationship).
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attorney’s new need to be aware of much more minor indicia of
violations than before requires a lawyer to become a policeman as
well as a counselor, always on the lookout for evidence that could,
from an objective, ex post perspective, be considered indicative of a
186
material violation. On the one hand, this may lead managers to
dissemble and attorneys to avoid investigating managerial claims,
leading to poorer compliance with the securities laws. On the other
hand, this upheaval in the accepted relationship between lawyers and
managers may be a necessary first step to achieve real change in the
role of corporate lawyers towards what that role was supposed to be
all along—that of a fiduciary to the entity rather than its
constituents.187
Third, these magnified attorney obligations may increase the
power of attorneys and shift their role from merely an advisory role
188
to an active and directive role, while at the same time decreasing the
influence of the client. If, with Part 205 in effect, managers believe
that an attorney will report information up the ladder, they are
naturally more likely to abide by the legal opinions of the lawyer.189
To be sure, the sudden rebalancing of power between the lawyer and

186. See Mark L. Tuft, For Your Eyes Only: California’s Duty of Confidentiality Is Both
More Inclusive and More Protective than the Attorney-Client Privilege, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2002, at
26, 32. (“[T]he client risks the loss of rights without due process at the hands of the lawyer in
whom the client has been encouraged by the law to repose trust and confidence.”). Lawyers
may of course react in exactly the opposite way. By simple human tendency, lawyers may begin
to avoid involvement with problems or to develop an unwillingness to pursue topics that they
might have to report. If one’s eyes are closed, evidence has a tendency to not come to one’s
attention. However, this is not likely to constitute a successful defense under an objective
standard, making the policing consequence far more likely.
187. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2002); see Deborah A. DeMott, The
Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 311–12 (1998) (analyzing the duties owed by
lawyers to the “wider cast of characters” ignored by the traditional view of lawyer as agent);
Harris, supra note 83, at 638 (arguing that a lawyer’s duty is to do what is best for the
corporation to the point of disregarding the instructions of its constituents); Kessler, supra note
35, at 472 n.63 (characterizing decisions absolving lawyers of aiding and abetting liability for
client fraud as an example of injustice arising from the undue influence of lawyers on the
judiciary).
188. The term “directive” is loosely drawn from a symposium featuring Professor Robert
Cochran in which Professor Cochran outlined alternative directive, client-centered, and
collaborative approaches to moral issues in counseling. Symposium, Client Counseling and
Moral Responsibility, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 591, 592–96 (2003).
189. A central tenet of applied game theory is that credibly committing to limit one’s
options ex ante in a strategic interaction can lead one to a much better outcome. See generally
PANKAJ GHEMAWAT, COMMITMENT: THE DYNAMIC OF STRATEGY (1991). From this
perspective, the attorney’s new duties counterintuitively become a stick with which the lawyer
can drive the client.
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190
client may seriously disrupt their relationship, but Sarbanes-Oxley is
here to stay, and managers are going to need lawyers at least as much
as before the Act was passed. With their continued participation
assured, the greater power of lawyers may effectively lead to precisely
the desired result: increased compliance with the securities laws.191
Fourth and finally, the increase in the harshness and breadth of
sanctions threatens to decrease both the volume and creativity of
transactional securities work. A securities lawyer is in at least some
capacity a problem solver: given a set of client objectives, the lawyer’s
192
job is to devise a legal strategy to accomplish those objectives. But
with the consequences of error increased and managerial pressure
reduced, innovation is likely to flag and creative methods of reducing
transaction costs may be overlooked. The effect of Part 205’s
sanctions is thus to increase transaction costs by engendering greater
attorney conservatism, lowering efficiency, increasing the cost of
capital, dampening client growth, and inhibiting the spread of even
legitimate innovations. However, efficiencies can be illusory, growth
based on falsehoods can be fatal, and innovation can be destructive in
the long run.193 It was unquestionably innovative for Enron,
presumably on the advice or at least consent of its lawyers, to obtain
off-balance sheet financing by placing its own stock, rather than hard
assets, into a securitization vehicle.194 To the extent that Part 205
prevents such abuses, the dampening of innovation may well be
compensated by greater investor trust in, and efficiency of, the

190. Perhaps most disturbing is that the greater power given to the lawyer may allow
attorneys to intrude further into business judgments traditionally reserved for business persons.
This is of concern because corporate law has long assumed that law should be left to experts in
law while business should be left to experts in business. See supra note 128 and accompanying
text. The erosion of this assumption opens the door further to the trend of major law firms on
more business-like functions, such as investment banking, venture capital, or management
consulting, which in turn erodes the lawyer’s independence and ability to question such business
decisions later. Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 410, at 8–12
(1992) (discussing similar concerns when lawyers act as directors of client corporations, but
permitting such dual positions).
191. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 pmbl., Pub. L. No 107-24, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003)).
192. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2002) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client as to
the means by which they are to be pursued.”).
193. See In re Enron Corp. No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2002) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (cataloging various abuses of accounting and securitization practices at
Enron Corporation preceding its Chapter 11 petition).
194. Id. at 37.
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securities markets. The primary economic question, which this Note
must leave open, is whether the losses on the individual transaction
195
level are sufficiently offset by gains in confidence and accuracy.
CONCLUSION
Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC rules of Part
205 promulgated thereunder were unquestionably a great departure
from other, preexisting regimes concerning the responsibilities of the
securities lawyer. Yet these new rules were just as clearly direct
descendants of those regimes. Comparison of the new rules to the
preexisting regimes along the four dimensions described in Part II—
who is required to act, when the duty to act arises, what acts are
required or permitted, and why an individual should comply—
demonstrates that, along each dimension, Part 205 incorporates some
of the most expansive preexisting standards or concepts available. As
a consequence of the expansion of each dimension, yet another aspect
of the lawyer’s role is radically redefined.
On a final note, this may only be the beginning. To utilize the
analogy of a bell curve, prior to the enacting of Sarbanes-Oxley, all of
the elements of Part 205 were located at one tail of the curve, fairly
well removed from the median, mainstream expectations of lawyers.
Yet now, through codification, these elements have become the new
median, the new starting point, leaving room for even more radical
interpretations and redefinitions at the new extremes of the curve. It
remains to be seen, therefore, whether the current and continued
redefining of the role of the securities attorney will be a destruction
or a revitalization.

195. This particular debate may be well summarized by two statements made in a similar
debate that took place over the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa, and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm. “It has . . . been charged that if the SEC ‘had
had jurisdiction during the early days of the development of the west we would have had no
mining industry in the United States today.’” LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 1 SECURITIES
REGULATION 169 (3d ed. 1998) (citation omitted). Professor Lowenstein responded: “Don’t
believe it. The West would have been developed, but many more pine trees would have been
felled and financial printers would have prospered mightily.” Louis Lowenstein, Shareholder
Voting Rights: A Response to SEC Rule 19c-4 and to Professor Gilson, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 979,
999 (1989).

